Game theory conceptions apply in many areas especially in communication network, which provides a scaffold to design the model and analyze conflict among decision making process. Over the last few decades stream control mechanism has more attention in the early stages of research in communication network. The motivation of this work is deep understanding on the stream control mechanism problem in multi-class networks. In this paper, game theoretic perspectives are presented and the appropriate frame work for the study of stream control mechanism problem is analyzed. Consider a min-max routing problem, where the control mechanism has to decide to which of N queues that the arriving customer should be sent. The service rate in each queue is dependent on the state of the system, may change in time and is unknown to the control mechanism. The goal of the control mechanism is to design an efficient policy which guarantees the best performance under the worst case service conditions. ie., Arriving customers are routed by a control mechanism, with the purpose of minimizing the total discounted holding cost under worst-case service conditions. Then the problem is viewed as a zero-sum (Stochastic) Markov game between the routing control mechanism and a service control mechanism. In zero-sum (Stochastic) Markov game, where the server acts as player 1 and the stream control mechanism acts as a player 2. Each player assumed to have the information of all the previous action of players as well as the current and the past states of the system. The main results obtained are to identify 1024 C. Vijayalakshmi and K. Sivaselvan the optimal strategy for both players. A value iteration technique is used to establish properties of the value of the game, which are related to super modularity and convexity.
Introduction
Optimal resource allocation is one of the most important tasks to be resolved in computer network. Resource allocation can be divided into three parts stream control mechanism, routing and buffer management. These management tasks will affect the performance of computer network. If the stream control mechanism is prepared aptly, then the probability for nodal blocking and deadlock is reduced very much. The stream control mechanism principle is shift to congestion control mechanism form the interior of the network to the points of traffic admittance. Consider a problem of dynamic stream control mechanism of arriving customer into a finite buffer in which at most one customer can join the system with respect to time slot. In this system, consider one user control mechanism the dynamic stream of arriving customer into a buffer and the congestion phenomena is modeled by the other users. The service rate in each queue is dependent on the state of the system, may change in time and is unknown to the control mechanism. The main aim of the control mechanism is to design a control mechanism strategy that guarantees the best performance under the worst-case service conditions. Formulate this problem as a zero-sum (Stochastic) Markov game between the routing control mechanism and a service control mechanism. In zero-sum (Stochastic) Markov game, where the server acts as player 1 and the stream control mechanism acts as a player 2. A value iteration technique is used to solve this problem, which shows an optimal policy for the stream control mechanism. The stream control mechanism decreases the input stream as the number of customer increases and the Quality Of Service (QoS) decreases with the number of customers in the queue , under the worst-case service conditions. The property of the value function shows the optimal strategy which are related to super modularity and convexity.
Literature Survey
The stream control mechanism using theory of zero-sum Markov games had been developed by E. Altman (1994) 
Stochastic Speculative Mathematical Model of a System
Consider a queueing system of single server queue with finite buffer of size K and assume that a customer may join the system in a time slot. Let X i denotes the number of customers in the system at time t, t = 0, 1, . . . and the state space is denoted by X = {0, 1, . . . , K}. Let g max be a real number satisfying, 0 < g max < 1. If the stream control mechanism chooses a player 2 in a finite set F x = {ai} i = 1, 2, at the beginning of the each time slot. If the router chose an action i at time t, that has the interpretation that the customer has routed to queue i with the probability of an arrival with respect to time slot. This interpretation is adequate to consider the length of the queues as the state of the system. If action ai is chosen at time t then a customer can enter the system in [t, t + 1) with probability ai, i = 1, 2.
If the customer remains in the queue at the end of time slot which means that a customer has receive a successful service with probability p ∈ Ω, where Ω ∈ p min , p max . If the service fails the customer remains in the queue and if it succeeds the customer leaves the system and the value p represents the quality of service. The main objective of the stream control mechanism is to find the best strategy under the worst case service conditions. At the end of the time slot a customer may leave the system with probability p. The state X t denotes the number of customers in the system at time t, t ∈ IN , and A 1t and A 2t denotes the events of the server and the stream control mechanism.
For any number ξ ∈ [0, 1], the transition law l is:
Let γ be a fixed number in [0, 1) and the discounted cost is: The γ-discounted value of the game is
Then the optimal policies m * and n * is defined as sup
Optimal Strategies
The optimal policies of player 1 and player 2 that achieves the supremum and infimum in the matrix game
A value iteration technique is used to establish properties of the value of the game that are related to super-modularity and convexity. The value iteration technique that requires the property lim n→∞ T n γ f = V γ for every function f ∈ κ. The function f : X × {1, 2} × {1, 2} → satisfies the following Monotone and Integer-Convex property.
is monotone decreasing in x for i = 1, 2. P 2 : If f (x, 2, j) − f (x, 1, j) is monotone increasing in x for i = 1, 2. P 3 : If f (x) is integer convex in x then for any x ∈ X, f (x + 2) − f (x + 1) ≥ f (x + 1) − f (x). P 4 : If f (x) monotone increasing in x then for any x ∈ X, f (x + 1) ≥ f (x).
Queues with Hindering
In this section, multiple class routing problem is discuss based on the application of game theory. Consider a queuing system of "M " servers which are shared by the routing problem of two class of packets α and β, where one class of packets may be queued at the buffer and the other are blocked when it exceeds the space. The class α packets can be queued, while the class β packets are blocked. Consider the two cases for the above queueing systems; (i) the blocking threshold for class β packets is greater than or equal to the number of servers, ie.,
(ii) the blocking threshold for class β packets is less than or equal to the number of servers, ie., N ≤ M . Consider the case where the blocking threshold N for class β packets is greater than or equal to the number of servers M . The steady state probability of 'n' packets in the system π n is λ α +λ β µ n π 0 n! for n ≤ N . The probability that a class β packet is lost then
The over all average packet delay is:
where Q is the average number of packets in the system. The average packet delay for class α is:
Consider the case where the blocking threshold N for class β packets is less than or equal to the number of servers M . The steady state probability of 'n' packets in the system π n is
The blocking probability for class β packets is
The average number of packets in the system is Q = . The average packet delay for class α is:
Game Theory Formulation for Multi-Server Queueing System
Consider packets arrive to the parallel system which is composed of K multiserver queueing systems according to a Poisson arrival rate λ . Φ i is the fraction of class packets assigned to the multi-server queueing system i and the fraction vector for each class is Φ = [. . . Φ i . . . ]. For example consider two class of packets η and κ belongs to . Therefore the class η wants to minimize its average packet delay thats in queue and the class κ packets are blocked and wants to minimize its blocking probability. Each class must know the cost function and constraints. Constraint and Cost function for class η:
and Constraint and Cost function for class κ is: 
Conclusion
In this paper, game theory approach is used in the network routing problem, where one class of packets wants to minimize its average packet delay, while the other class of packets wants to minimize its blocking probability. The several performance measure are found for a multi-server queueing system in which the first class of packets is in queued and the other class is when the number of packets in the system is more than some threshold. Graphical representation shows that various implementation that could support the optimal stream control mechanism in routing algorithm.
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